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ART. II.—History of Tennasserim, by Captain JAMES LOW, Madras
Army, M.R.A.S., &c. &c.
{Continued from Vol. III., page 336.)
CHAPTER IX.
LANGUAGES.
THE people of this coast are of three distinct classes,—the Burman,
the M6n, and the Karean, and they are distinguished also by speak-
ing different languages. The Burmans of Mergui speak a dialect of
the language of Ava, as do those of Tavoy.
The Mdns use the P'hasea M6n, or Pegu language, which is quite
distinct from the Burman, and the Karean tribes have languages
peculiar to themselves.
The Burman language is already known to the world, from two
grammars and a dictionary of it, which were published in Bengal.1
The Tavoy dialect is that, which under the title of "Burma,'' has
been treated of in. " Leyderis Comparative Vocabulary of the Burman,
Siamese, and Malayan Dialects."
The Tavoy character differs in a slight degree from that used in
Ava.
The Siamese language, which once prevailed in Tannau, is now
only spoken by a few Siamese settlers.
The Mdns employ the same character nearly as the Burmans,
and so do the people of North Laos; but it would not be easy to
show which of these nations was the original adopter or framer of it.
The Karean dialects lean to the Siamese.
The Peguan language being that in most general use next to the
Burman tongue, a few observations on it may be here offered.
THE PEGUAN, COMMONLY TERMED THE MAN, OR MON
LANGUAGE.
This is the language at present spoken in Pegu, and is appa-
rently unconnected with the Ava or Burman, and considerably re-
moved from the Thai or Siamese language, excepting, perhaps, in so
far as respects the genuine characteristics common to all the Indo-
Chinese tongues.
1
 One by Dr.* Carey, and another by Dr. Judson. The Dictionary by Dr.
Judson.
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The Man seems to be neither so purely monosyllabic, nor so
nicely intonated as the Thai. But its radical monosyllables have a
close resemblance to those of the latter; and a great number are
common to both, although the signification in each is intrinsically
different,—thus :
Siiong, in Man, means drink. In Thai, if, provided.
Chep, in Man, taste. In Thai, sick.
Kla, in Man, means tiger. In Thai, bold, brave.
That the Mdn is further removed from the Burman than the
Siamese has been concluded from personal inspection, and from my
having found the Burmans, who were questioned on the subject, and
into whose hands a vocabulary of the two languages was put, totally
unable to comprehend above a very few vocables. They could not
even enunciate Mdn words, from seeing them written, although the
character does not much differ from their own. This is the natural
consequence of the Pali alphabet having originally been tortured to
suit a language for which it was never designed.
The orthography of the Mdn words in the Burma character, and
as exhibited here in the Roman letters, will be found, from a similar
cause, at some degree of variance. The latter will be observed to
convey (as nearly as our alphabet will admit of) the true powers of
the letters and vocables of the Mdn.
The final sounds are very fickle, such as, where p is changed to
m, h used for t soft, p for b, t for d, and r for I, h for s, and
gh for au.
The following seem to be final consonants of the Man Colloquial
Medium :
t, p, k, h, m, n, (strong nasal) n, ng.
The voice is frequently and suddenly suspended at the end of a
word, even where the short (° mark) h is not used.
The alphabet is divided into five series, with ten single letters.
It appears from the above list, that the Man has two final conso-
nants more than the Thai is possessed of, while it trusts to a nearly
similar system with that of the Thai for its initial, medial, and final
vowels.
The final vowel simple sounds are fifteen1 in number; and the
compound I am inclined to state at twenty-four. The medials
appear to be also twenty-four in number.
The Man admits of the following colloquial combinations of
letters, which are foreign to the Thai, viz: h before consonants;
1
 Independent of ou, <m, ah, dh.
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Mai (clai) barter; h,moh, stone; hmain, prince; (mn) mmh (pin-
nih) person; (kn) knok, great; hn, hndng mo-ei, a star; bl, as in
bloai-ltieit, earth and sky; dap blungat, bald head. And also a fre-
quent use of the nasal French n, knoei, far. Ko-ein, day; Hetn, a
house.1 And the French u or oo (both hard and soft) recurs much
oftener than in the Thai; dung, country; khlung, high; pung,
rice. It is also combined with other diphthongs, in a manner not
often found in the Thai, and not easily conformable to our organs
of speech. These are rapidly pronounced; hlu-ein mmh, a hired
servant; kldeit, a pig. Some vowel terminations resemble the
Hindustani guttural gh, thus: kaa, to give, is pronounced like kagh.
However great the claim of the Man to originality may be, when
compared with the languages spoken in the countries betwixt Pegu
and China, and the Burman language; still it most unequivocally
betrays its alliance at some remote period with the Chinese Man-
darin Colloquial Medium, in applying to its monosyllables a system
of tones differing only in frequency and intensity from that used in
the latter; thus duh, hatred; duh, ripe, as fruit; tout, forget; wdt,
young (female) ; kldng, come; klung, boat.
The following are some words selected from the Vocabulary as
closely resembling each other, to which are added a few Malay and
Pali words. The words within the parenthesis are not considered.
MAN. THAI YAI. MALAYOO. PALL ENGLISH.
chep chim clium Taste.
rup rop rupa rupa Face. Form.
Arre ulr (lau) uruk sura Spirits.
Kuttam po Kuttam Crabs.
Kappau pun Kapur ' Lime.
SumSrum... (ngo) ular Sappa Snake.
Manganfa ... thoei mangko Cup.
Sa mut mot Simmut Ant.
Xha thang (Amas) (So wan na) Gold.
ba sae 0ek) bissi Iron.
Krit Krit Kris Dagger. Kris.
Nipan Saivan Surga Niphan Heaven.
Tehareulr... Narok Naraka Naraka Hell.
Wain len Main Play. Oame.
Sampan jaU~a f Sampan Nawa Boat.
The Pali is also the sacred text of the Mans, and of consequence
their language is much interpolated with words transferred from it.
1
 Nearly the pronunciation of the third person plural of the P. of the Indicat,
of the Hindustani verb, to be; hueen, hein.
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The article in the Mdn follows (as in the Thai) the noun; ha a
hmoh mo-ei, give me a stone. It does not appear that generic parti-
cles are so much affected in defining nouns as in the Thai and Ma-
layu; chatih mo-ei, one tree; mnih mo-ei, one person; cho-ei moei,
one straw; hein mo-ei, one house. In the following instance a
suffix is used, loeit mo-ei chang, a book, or, book one writing.
The indefinite article is not expressed.
a a hein, go to the house.—Hein hmain, the king's house.
Mdn nouns have no inflections to distinguish the gender, num-
ber, or case.
Hein mo-ei, a house.—Mnih krauh mo-ei, a man.—Kon hmain
preati mo-ei, a princess.—Cheh or (kyeh) krauh mo-ei, a horse.—
Kon mnih, a child.—Krauh, boy.—Pria, girl.
Particles supply the place of inflection in these instances :—and
again,
Kla kraiih, a tiger.—Kla prea-au, a tigress.—Kuchim krauh, male
bird.—Kuchim preau, female bird.
' Affixes also point out the cases, but are sometimes omitted.
Thus,
Mnih kuttatin nil hein; the man fell from the house.—Oai
kiting nu Tewai; I came from the country of Tavoy.—Kltieing
kiting he"in; many men come to the house.—Kit ne-ung ka oei;
give another to me.
To form the Plural, reduplication of the noun is had recourse to,
or particles are affixed, thus :
Kuchim kuchim; birds.—Hein klu-hg; many houses.—Krop
6n,few things.
Pronouns do not appear so numerous as in the Thai.
o-ei doeit a a.—I wish to go.
o-ei hti tein.—I don't know. (I, not know),
pu-eh mnih h£k,h&h.—Thou art not (a) good man
Pu-eh a a.—Go thou.
Deh mnih hnok khah.—He is a good man.
Kunti-i a a pha-at.—All the apes go, i. e. they (the apes go)
Kya.it kiting.—Come you.
Kyait a-a proh proh.—Go you quickly, or you go quickly.
Oei du-eit kya.it.—Your (majesty's) slave; or, simply, Sir.—
In reply to a question.
Tulaktin Chia pting.—His highness eats his dinner (rice).
Mnih kdh rau ?—Who is that person ?
Hein peh ya la rau ?—Where is your house ?
Moei chi tak rau ?—What (o'clock) time is it ?
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Ko-ein Kattau.—It is mid-day.
San mo-a chi.—How many dollars ?
Kit i-at ka oeL—Bring clothes (to me.)
Nti la kiting.—Whence come ?
Adjectives are easily compared, by having words denoting in-
crease placed after them.
COMPARISON.
1. Hein kah kam.—A good house. 1. Mnih koh k'hah.—He is a good person.
2. Hein kah ngi.—A better house. 2. Mnih koh khah kam.— That person ia
3. Hein kah kiting.— The best house. better.
3. Mnih koh khah ngee.—Still better.
Mnih koh k'hah sam phS at.—That
person is best, {lit. better than all.)
The adjective follows the substantive, and the verb the ad-
jective.
Adjectives are compounded. Mnih puttaik hong, the brave
hearted; Priih that, noise j Saat saat, slow.
The verb seems simple. It follows the pronoun, and precedes
the noun and adjective.
Present. o-ei chi'a, I eat; Kyeit a a hein hmein, you go to the
palace (the king's house) ; delr krip proh proh, he
runs fast; oei kMng dting Tawai, I come (or came)
from the country of Tavoy.
Past. The adverb precedes the verb thus: deh M kyatin, he
did not survive; deh M ket, he does not want it.
And it is placed between the simple pronoun and one (or the
same) representing our oblique case.
deh klung tak oei.—They (all) beat me.
Aorist Potential. oei hu tong man.—I cannot leap.
oei chu man lep.—I can write.
o-ei du-eit a a raka luk,hun.—I 'wish to go, Sir.
Passive. Future. o-ei du-eit ku-fe plau ra.—I shall be sick.
Imperatively. Kyeit a a ra.—You may go.
Participiall]/. Chia arra.—Having eaten.
Passively.—Here the direct expression of the action as affecting
the noun is preferred. Klaau M pagoa, the dog bites the cat.
Otherwise auxiliaries are used,—thus : deh teh tak, he got a beating.
The numerals have been already exhibited. They follow the
noun in most instances.
Adverbs are generally placed before the verb to which they refer.
Hmsin tait a a mtinghet dong,• the king is gone without the fort.—
Ala a a; where (are you) going?—Oei limmCih KUng; I am just
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now arrived.—Kiting taup taup oei; come with me.—Sang klung
krdng; across the river.—Krop hnoh ka o i; give another to me.
I have not had an opportunity of inspecting any authentic
poetical works in the Man language.
The following couplets were orally communicated to me by a
Meng Man. They are in a popular style, and nearly resemble, in
their spirit, the Malayan Pantun. The stanzas are. composed of
verses containing three lines of four words each, and without rhyme.
Their verses generally contain trite allusions and obscure metaphors,
admitting, in the latter case, some latitude of interpretation.
The recitative of the Mans resembles that of the Siamese, and
in it, the language is much softened.
Couplets addressed by a Lover to his Mistress.
1.
A customary invocation of the Gods and Dei-
. ties, previous to undertaking a journey or a
voyage.
2.
My beloved remains at home.
How can I endure the thoughts of separation ?
My very soul is parehed with grief.
3.
Yon will remain at home, my love, while I am
forced to leave you, like a timid mouse at the
mercy of the cats.
4.
I go to prove the boisterous sea.
Dangers attend me—but my soul is over-
whelmed with the grief alone of separation
from thee.
1.
Yukyayu-thd.
Yu tho yu sang.
Rum peng oei ngi.
2.
Yod mein tf pre-au
Kau ngi au Kfchan.
Kupung ngun ngi.
3.
Ngai mang dai hem.
Ilmaiu ka pa koei.
Hoh rong o-ei ko-ein.
4.
Hau a a than bu-i.
Bu-i ka la poh.
Koh rong-oei ko-eing.
CHAPTER X.
MUSIC.
THE Burmans and Peguers delight in music. They sing ge-
nerally in a high key j thus imitating the Chinese taste. Their
vocal music therefore, to an European ear, appears to arise from a
strained and unnatural effort.
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MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS.
The following instruments are used on occasions of ceremony,
and in processions, and may be called the "out of door band." In
it the Sein is generally the leading instrument:
1. Segi. The bass drum.
2. Ozi. A small drum which is held under one arm and is
beaten by the hand. It is a tenor drum.
3. Si. A drum, which in size is betwixt the Segi and the Ozi.
4. Kiwein. Small metal gongs of different sizes, ranging up to
two octaves.
5. Hnd. A brass trumpet or harsh dissonant clarionet, having
a wooden six-holed flute attached to its upper orifice. This is
moveable, and is pulled out to a sufficient length when the instru-
ment is to be played. A number of mouth-reeds, of different sizes,
are suspended from the top of the flute.. The sound greatly re-
sembles that of the Pipe of the North; and were a pibroch to be sent
forth from it in one of the deep valleys amidst the Tavayan moun-
tains, it is possible, that even a Child of the Mist might, in listen-
ing to it, be rapt in imagination to a Highland glen.
6. PiM-i. A flute made of one joint of bamboo ; and reaching
to a third.
7. Pekkwe or Yegwin. Cymbals of different sizes.
8. Wa le kau. Pieces of split bamboo, with which time is kept.
9. Sein. A circular frame, having many small drums suspended
from it. These compass about two octaves.
THE CONCERT BAND, OR AUYEN. (Vide Plate.)
1. Saun. A harp, having thirteen silken strings.
2. Magyaun. The Alligator. It has three brass-wire strings.
3. Thr6. A three silken stringed violin, with a very curved
bow, bent with horse hair.
4. Pillui. The flute before described.
5. Hne\ The trumpet.
6. 6. 6. Ye-gwin. Cymbals of four different sizes.
7. Ozi, the tenor drum.
8. Segi.
The bands have leaders, who play the chief instruments, which
are' any one of the first three numbers.
VOL. IV.
BTIRMAN MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS.
1. Saun. 4. £ilMi. 7. Ozi.
2. Magyatin. 5. Hnf. 8. Seg&
3. Thrtf. 6. Ye-gwin.
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The following specimens of Burman, Siamese, and Malayan
Music will save the reader the trouble of conjecturing the relative
degrees of proficiency in the art1 attained by these people. The
song given is a favourite one with the Tavoy fair. It is almost too
idiomatic to admit of any, except a burlesque version in English.
SONGS.
THB LOVBR."
1. " O Maiden fair," in dark saloon,
2. Why toil at spinning wheel P
3. Come let us go before the noon,
4. Its burning rays we feel,
5. And gather crackling underwood,
6. With which to cook the evening's food.
THE MOTHER.
1. O daughter, whence that heavy load,
2. So soon cast at my feet ?
3. 'Tis plain no wooer crossed your road;
4. Come eat this plantain sweet,
5. This seedless8 plantain eat.
THE 1OVBB.
1. O Maiden fair—0 Maiden fair,
2. I pray you tell me soon,
3. Breathe you the Mergui mountain-air,
4. Or that of forest-wreathed Kalun;
5. Pandanns flowers your locks entwine,
6. O Gods! if such bright pearls were mine !
THE MAID.
1. With flowers my hair is gaily bound,
2. To gather them I much have toiled,
3. Before these brilliant gems I found,
4. My brow with dust and heat was soiled,
5. If you in hymeneal bowers,
6. Desire your maiden fair to see;
7. Come pay the price of these bright flowers;
8. This shall my only answer be.
1
 I am indebted for the Burman music to Lieut. Sherman, Madras Infantry,
who has also favoured me with some useful information, regarding the state of
and improvement on the Tennasaerim Coast, since I left it, in Sept. 1825. The
Siamese and Malayan,airs have been set to music by Qhe Draman, an inhabitant
of Penang, who has been long known to the settlement «a their Niel Gow; and
Lieutenant Sherman has also favoured me.by revising thein.
8
 The popularity of these words depends on their idiomatic peculiarity of
expression; any translation of them, therefore, into English must have a burlesque
effect. They have little of poetry in them.
8
 The original has "seedy plantain," in allusion to that fruit being given to
children on account of its nutritious quality.
J .OMe-Pyu,
2.' Tabyen bya bein kain
d'hu
3. Then yu wen %6 me"
4. Th£n yu wen ge" me".
1. Ten ze pi kya
2. Tha hmui hla
3. Ben ngapyo thi he
4. Thamen ku me"
5. Si byo thi nt
6. Tamen ku men.
1. O Me Pyu
2. Beit taun thu la
3. Kalun la
4. Hnin pan panza ma.
1. Hnin pan m<5 m<5
2. Kyui so zo
3. Do galo pan bo pe".
SIAMESE AIRS.
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Cha lok lo-ang.
9—P
=1—
BE
SIAMESE AIRS. 53
Nang nok.
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Sarika keo.
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The King of Siam's March, or Phriy a dun.
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BURMAN AIR.
8ET FOR A. THIRD FLUTE OR FLAGOLET.
Moderato. Set by T. S. S.
N.B.—In playing the above Air great attention must be paid to the dotted
notes and slurs, to give them their natural effect. They, if played on a third
flute, sound precisely like that of the Burmese, and will agree with any of their
instruments. ... . '.
MALAYAN.
Chinteb manis gunong.
Tuan tuan Nona.
=?=
Der umbun ka-terunti.
0-r*~
I
MALAYAN AIRS. 57
/ - N
sip
A BATTA AIR. Dadong sidadong.
H h-
Lagu dua.
j .
0-*-
58 MALAYAN AIRS.
Dondang Malayu.
-P PTP *'*•
trt-
1 I I I
Ayer paxang.
-4—=H
Buang battu timbul kalassa.
t
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Hati Raja Gunong.
%J
Merahwi.
60 MALAYAN AIRS.
Sumbawa China.
MALAYAN AIRS.
1
61
I4--A+
Dondang Bangkaulu.
ifc ^ = S
Lalladi lali.
j ; . i
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1. Bunga kuchapiring kumbang dalam mangko.
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'2. Rangkong sudah kring mata sudah mengunta.
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Radin Galuh.
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Sambawa pirindu.
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Ya Nona.
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Amboi sayang.
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MALAYAN AIRS.
Bujang Sulong.
i 1 i
% &£&!=»£-=?=£
" Red Gold," or Amas merah.
VOL. IV.
66 MALAYAN AIRS.
P-F-r*i
tr m
Bujang piyatu.
fcte
in*
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Naik tingka battu pitte gunda rusa.
i
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prpqpp:
S=a -P—P
Suvong dayong.
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Adek o-e.
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CHAPTER XI.
tHB SITUATION OP MARTABAN AND TENNASSERIM, POLITICALLY VIEWED WITH RE-
FERENCE TO BRITISH, BURMAN, AND SIAMESE INTERESTS ALSO A COMPARATIVE
VIEW OP INDIAN AND INDO-CHINESE MILITARY STRENGTH, AND PECULIAR MODES
OP WARFARE.
POLITICALLY viewed, the possession of Martaban must «ver be
deemed of primary importance by the holders of Pegu. The Bur-
mans are therefore perfectly aware of its value as a frontier line, and
as offering the key to Siam. But by the late cession of part of it, they
and the Siamese, in one point of view, have fairly been gainers ; an
assertion which can hardly be denied after an inspection of the map.
The great San-lun (Sanlun or Sanluen) river, running nearly in a
south direction from the high range of mountains which bounds
Siam, forms a well-defined line of demarcation betwixt the Burman
territory and that part ceded to the British. They have retained
the fortified town of Martaban, and the whole population on the
north bank of the river. The ceded territory on the south bank,
and lying within the province, had been for years of no value to the
Burmans; and had, although once containing a numerous popula-
tion, been fairly abandoned to the inroads of the Siamese. This
tract is now the strongest defence of both of these people, and will
be so while they keep at peace with the British; for the latter can-
not admit Siamese or Burman troops to pass through their territory
to attack each other, while peace remains an object. Had the
Siamese not doubted the ability of the British to contend with Ava,
they would assuredly have been sooner prepared to take advantage
of our successes, by attacking and securing Tavoy and Mergui at the
kast for themselves. Their proceedings were luckily too clumsy,
wavering, and slow, to enable them to anticipate the British detach-
ments which took these places. Their pride and ambition were
equally mortified, at the very time that their implacability towards
the Burmans was gratified by the result. But their subsequent
conduct showed, that they chiefly aimed at aggrandizing themselves
without any serious risk; and it was on several occasions of so
dubious a cast, that they were justly believed to be enemies rather
than friends to the British.
Colonel Smith, who had been sent to negotiate with the generals
of their army lying above Martaban, found them lavish of promises,
but slow to evince a sincere disposition to co-operate. He had
permitted the chiefs to send over parties to purchase provisions in
VOL. IV. G
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the bazar of Martaban; and it was found out soon after, that an
alarming number had on various pretences remained in the town;
and one man, in a fit of intoxication, had boasted that it would soon
be in possession of their army.
Captain Williamson, who succeeded Colonel Smith, was there-
fore under the necessity of forthwith ordering every Siamese out of
the place. After that time, several Burmans had privately stated,
that a project was, at the period alluded to, in agitation by indivi-
duals (Burmans, and Peguers in their interest), to murder all the
European officers, and to introduce the Siamese to the towns, who
were not to appear in the business, but to give out that on learning
the event, they had hurried to assist their friends the English. No
public investigation of this matter took place, but it will serve to
show the degree of caution with which their proffered friendship, at
any time, should be viewed.
Their army, on learning the check which General Cotton had
met with on the first attack of Dennobyu, which was rapidly
reported all over the country, and may have reached them a
week or ten days after that event, suddenly broke off their con-
ferences with Colonel Smith, without assigning any reason, and
retreated towards Siam. At this retrograde movement, his Siamese
majesty was much displeased, and directed the general to return to
the confines of Martaban. A party of about 1000 men lay en-
camped on the right of my route, from Wakru to the town; and
their scouts, on seeing the advanced Sepoys of my party, fled pre-
cipitately, supposing, probably, that they formed a piquet of a large
body.
There is one point of their conduct requiring attention. It is
clear that amongst other objects, they aimed at setting up the
ancient M6n or Pegu dynasty. They were aware that the prince,
who, through their interposition and aid should be placed upon the
throne, would, from feelings both of gratitude and of interest, admit
Siamese officers to civil and military offices, and that Siam, in fact,
would virtually govern. It is well known that the Siamese then
used every means in their power to conciliate the Mdns; and that
although they prevented many of that nation (who had been stolen
or kidnapped on former occasions,) from returning to their country,
yet they treated them with as much, or greater 'consideration, than
they did their own people. In various letters addressed to British
authorities, while serving in the Burman war, the Siamese court
affirmed that it had permitted all the Peguers, who chose it, to
return home; but it is known that the most effective part of the
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Siamese standing army was then,' as it probably is at this very
moment, composed of Peguers (who are the Meen of M. de la
Loubere, or Ming Mdns), that the whole did not exceed 3,000 men;
and the army not 10,000, and that without mercenaries their force
would have been reduced to raw militia conscripts. It is not, how-
ever, believed that these Peguers are much attached to the Siamese
government; and it is supposed that the detention of their families
by the latter alone ensures their fidelity.
Upon three several occasions during the war, when a great alarm
was created in Bankok, by a false report that a fleet of British ships
was in the river, when the people were preparing to fly with their
effects, and troops were hastily got together; certain symptoms are
said to have indicated that the Pegu part of the army had not only
no disposition to engage in the then expected contest, but was ia-
clined to turn against the government.
The king, it was affirmed, talked of submission, while his courtiers
said, " If the country is to be taken from us, we ought wot to forego &
without a struggle to save our honour." After the alarms above
noticed, they began to construct chain-works to throw across the
river. But such an attempt would have more betrayed their igno-
rance than placed serious obstacles in the way of vessels navigating
it; and indeed the project was afterwards abandoned. The opinions
elicited by the aspect of affairs, and offered by me when employed
as envoy to Ligor, in 1824, were not shaken by subsequent events,
for the Siamese were not found of any service during the Burmaa
war. They blusteringly came forward with quivers full of warlike
words and promises, at a period when the " golden feet" could
barely balance his tottering tiara, and proffered their aid toj" exter-
minate the Burmans;" for this was their expression in reply to a letter
addressed by the Siamese court, to Colonel Smith at Rangoon,
Such an offer was in accordance with a demisavage state, and
pointed out the horrid evils which would have ensued, had an army
•of Siamese been allowed an opportunity of settling an account of
several centuries of revenge in the heart of Burma.
It could hardly, however, have been supposed, that even had
they been willing to assist the British, any serious diversion could
have been made in the direction of Martaban; the roads to Ava from
that province are not practicable uatil the middle of November, and
to have sent a Siamese array through Pegu would only have enabled
it to follow in the train of the Britjsh in their advance on Ava; and
would certainly have proved detrimental to the British interests in
1
 1825.
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the lower provinces, and obnoxious to the desire expressed by
General Sir A. Campbell, of conciliating the Peguers and Karean
tribes; for the Siamese would never have been able to proceed with-
out plundering the people who had obtained British protection. The
only quarter in which a diversion could have been effected with a
Siamese force, was either that of the eastern or north-eastern
frontier of Ava. The Siamese have easy access to the Martaban
province by the route of the Phra Songchd, or three Pagodas, and
by another pass still further to the northward, in the same province.
The Siamese are an aspiring race, yet wanting in adequate
means to realize highly ambitious projects. An increase to such
means as they do possess, seems to be an inevitable consequence
of the late war with Ava, and this without any acquisition of ter-
ritory in the direction of that state. While the Burman sway over
its neighbours shall remain suspended, Siam will have leisure to
strengthen herself and improve her resources; and as the military
spirit of the Burmans has been checked for a season by the suc-
cesses of the British, and their future condition is likely to be much
more circumscribed than it has ever been since they became a con-
quering people, it is reasonable to suppose that Siam may in time
rise to the first rank amongst Indo-Chinese States.
She will not then perhaps find it convenient to extend herself
westward, but the Malacca Peninsula, exclusive of the British pos-
sessions, lies before her an easy prey, unless British influence be
interposed to check them. These last may not be endangered, but
they will certainly be exposed to annoyance from misunderstand-
ings with the Court of Bankok, in reference to relations or existing
treaties with Malayan R&jas. Siam will likely also turn her atten-
tion to Camboja, and the tributary States of Laos, which cannot be
supposed capable of resisting her long. She has indeed been car-
rying on a sort of predatory border-warfare with the Cochinchinese
or their tributaries during the last two years. The Cochinchinese are,
however, a warlike people compared with their neighbours, and may
some day retort on Siam with interest. From the earnest inquiries
made at Penang by several Cochinchinese men of rank respecting
Junkceylon, it is conjectured that they would be glad to have it as a
post from which to annoy the Siamese possessions on the west coast
of the Peninsula of Malacca. It is well known that the governor of
the Lower Provinces of Siam, generally called the Ligor Raja, has
on several occasions manifested an inclination to assert inde-
pendence. Were the Chinese in Siam to confederate with the
Cochinchinese and the Ligorian, Siam would most probably be sub-
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dued. The British would then have a much more enterprising
people than the Siamese, fond as these are of dominion, to guard
against in the Straits of Malacca.
The Siamese materiel is supposed to excel that of the Burmans,
but their mode of fighting is nearly the same; one, which, if the ex-
pression be allowable, is defensive, while it is most actively offensive.
We have seen, throughout the late contest with us, the Burmaa
capacity for war displayed to its fairest advantage, and are suffi-
ciently warranted in forming conclusive inferences regarding it.
Any person who was a spectator of the events of the war, can have
little hesitation in affirming, that as a military nation, which it has
ever professed to be, Ava occupies a grade below that of any first-
rate or well-constituted native State in Hindustan. To this remark
it may be objected, that had the Burmans not been a brave race,
they could not have protracted the war so long.
In reply to the objection, it may only perhaps be required to
state that the Lower Provinces of Ava (or Pegu), and a great pro-
portion of Ava proper, are so densely covered with jungle, that the
Burmans, without even the cautious demibarbarous courage which
we may fairly allow them, would always have, as they had during
the late war, the advantage of attacking unseen, and of retreating to
places where no regular troops could follow them with the slightest
prospect of success. But natural obstacles to the progress of the
British detachments would have been of little avail to the Burmau
army, had the Ava Court relied on its courage alone for the issue.
That Court knew the character of its troops too well to expect fronx
them either enthusiasm or devotedness, and therefore wisely relied
on a coercive system; that such a system is not inconsistent with
the securing of military supremacy, is amply testified by dear-bought
experience in Europe. Its perfectly despotic nature, too, enabled it
to bring into full play every mean or energy the country possessed,
and so far as this admitted of, to exhibit an arrangement most con-
sistently efficient throughout its various ramifications. The Bur-
mans are a military people, because it has been the policy of their
rulers that they should be so, and not because they are impelled to
arms by a lofty warlike spirit, or ardent attachment to a leader.
This policy, by fostering an undue degree of pride, had given to the
Burman a rather martial appearance; had deceived him into the
excusable error of widely overrating his own capabilities, and thereby
armed him with an audacity and confidence which, at the breaking
out of the war, served him instead of high courage. The moment,
however, that his self-complacency was disturbed by a reverse, and
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the delusion was dispelled, he threw down the enchanted arms* arid
fledj or, bewildered by the sad reality to which he became now for
the first time awake, submitted himself to the bayonet without a
straggle.
It is well known that the nearest relatives of a Burman officer or
soldier, are security for his fidelity.
This was not at first of much use, further than preventing them
from deserting their colours. But latterly desertions became so
frequent, that it may be presumed the law had relaxed a little in its
operation, or had been really found insufficient to overcome the
terror which the British advance had spread over the country.
The Burmans adopted a mode of fighting the best fitted to their
encounter with an enemy superior in discipline and tactj and had
they kept solely to their stockades, and defended them with the
spirit which most Hindu garrisons similarly placed would have
shown, there can be little doubt that they might not only have pre-
vented the Rangoon division from penetrating the country beyond
that place during the first campaign, but would have certainly pro-
tracted the war to a much longer period than it endured. When
they changed their plan and invested Rangoon, they suffered ac-
cordingly, and severely.
Many instances are on record of Hindu garrisons in India de-
fending a breach with obstinacy, and disdaining quarter; but the
Burmans did not collectively do so upon any one occasion during
the war. As to individual displays of bravery, these occur amongst
any people, and are not, therefore, available for argument, nor have
they ever fairly met British troops in the open field. It is true that
throughout the contest many lives in officers and men were lost, but
such is the sure consequence of attacking an enemy, so situated,
that without much danger to himself he can deliberately deliver his
fire when an attacking column has approached within thirty yards
of himj and while he cannot be prevented from safely slinking into
his jungle, in the peculiar manner of Burmaus and Siamese. Their
movement is rapid without the appearance of running, and an army
of ten thousand men will seem to melt into the forest, and leave no
trace of their route.
There can be little doubt that the Burmans improved by the
experience they so dearly bought, and that their works, from the
storming of their fortified camp at Kokain, to the taking of
*. The Burmans beliere that certain incantations render them invulnerable,
and their arms irresistible.
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Dennobyti (both included), assumed a more commanding shape
than their former, generally square, stockades exhibited. The con-
struction of the latter would have rendered it proof against any
attack not directed and guided by European skill. It was in the opinion
of scientific engineers, a chef-d'oeuvre of Burman ingenuity and
perseverance. Its main strength lay in the outworks, not in the
stockade, and it may safely be affirmed that the chevaux de /rise,
abattis, trous de hup, &c. &c, with which it was environed, presented
an impassable barrier to troops. Nothing but shells and rockets, or
regular approaches and mining, can be successfully employed against
such a work. The two former missiles were guarded against by the
Bunddla, or General, who secured his men from their effects by
lodging them in deep holes and covered ways.
Since the war terminated,, the Court of Ava has unceasingly
exerted itself to re-arm its disorganized militia, and to restore con-
fidence. It has encouraged the resort of runaway European
soldiers and sailors, who are engaged in teaching its troops the use
of the great guns and the advantage of discipline, and its officers
proudly talk of the experience they have gained. They acknowledge
that they never supposed troops would attack so openly as ours,
and that their true policy would have been to throw the door open to
us, and then to have closed it when we had got beyond our
resources. If they assume such a haughty tone so recently after
defeat, what may we not expect from them a few years hence.
The investment of the great Dagon Pagoda was their boldest
attempt during the war,—here they advanced within point-blank
musket-range, burrowed like rabbits in the holes they had
scooped out for themselves on the retiring side of a hill, and bore for
six days a hot fire of shells and round shot. Here also several of
their invulnerables daily exposed themselves to the opposite fire,
making grotesque and menacing gestures, and exclaiming in these
terms, " O white men, tell us where the Burmans are now ?'' The
British soldiers were so much amused with the exhibition, that they
did not fire at these champions until they became too annoying
with their jinjals and small guns.
The religious vow which this party of their troops is said to
have made, that they would carry the, Pagoda (then the British
General's head quarters), or die at the feet of their great Phra, or
Statue of Buddha, failed to inspire them with durable courage j
for when they had reached the spot, their forced enthusiasm eva-
porated, and their commanders in the rear proceeded as usual to
decapitate those who gave way, in order to retain the rest at their
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posts. The Barmans are not o»ly inferior to the Indians when
defending their stockades and fortified positrons, but they are deci-
dedly so in the field, if we are to judge from the different manner in
which British troops have respectively been opposed by both.
This may arise from habit and early tuition; for a Burman deems
it the height of folly to expose his person, and thinks it much more
praiseworthy t» subvert and destroyjhis enemy by subtlety, than by
open warfare.
The Burman materiel is not to be compared fn quality to that
of any native powers in India. Except at Dennobyu perhaps, and
wherever their position could not be quickly approached, they
rarely fired their guns twice during a close attack,- and their
muskets, without bayonets, however serviceable they proved
behind a stockade, where a deliberate aim could be taken, and
where a match could supply the place of a lock, were for the
most part so old that they would have served only to hasten their
confasioa and consequent destruction in an open fight. Except
short swords and spears, they had no weapon on which to rely]] in
elose combat after they should have fired their muskets, since these
have no bayonets. They are well supplied with ammunition, as
they have mines of lead-ore, and manufacture gunpowder. Their
spears are long, and their swords are desperate weapons in close
combat, when opposed to swords of the same sort, but Hseless
against those of Europeans, or when opposed to a bayonet. The
metal, too, can hardly be termed steel, as it is generally easily bent.
The swivel jinjal is the only fire-arm they have perfect command
of, and it proved perhaps the most destructive one.
We cannot much condemn a Burman or Siamese soldier for the
unwillingness he shows to fight. He has no common cause with
his rulers to stimulate him to action; the bare excitement of pay
which the merest mercenary in a European army receives, is denied
to him, unless on momentous occasions (such as when the British
were advancing on the Burman capital), and in the advantages
accruing from his forced services he is not a participant. He has
but rarely, also, the consolation to see his general sharing with
himself the danger of the field; and he is aware that his superiors
have not the slightest sympathy with his sufferings.
It is obvious from the whole features of the Burman war, that
the strength of the Burman field army did not, at any one time
during its continuance, exceed fifty thousand fighting-men; and, that
in this number, not more, certainly, than five thousand were armed
with perfectly serviceable muskets. Garrisons are not here included
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in this enumeration, nor are the countries of Assam and Arracan,
and districts to the north and north-east, not properly Burman.
Several prisoners taken during the war, and other natives, stated to
me, that one good musket, in their acceptation of that term, and
two old ones, were allotted to every ten men; and that one
gun and three jinjals were allowed to every company or band
of one hundred men. By the average' of the table annexed, it
appears that 823 muskets of all descriptions were served out to
4,600 men.
It is exceedingly to be questioned if the Burman dominions
contain the population hitherto assigned to them by Colonel
Syraes, Captain Cox, and other writers. The former states it at
] 7,000,000, and the latter at 800,000. Such a discrepancy must
necessarily lead us to infer that both statements have been given at
random; and chiefly from native estimates purposely misstated.
Had either of these respectable authorities obtained access to the
registers of population which we know are kept by the governors
of Burman provinces with scrupulous exactness, we should not at
this moment be in doubt regarding the true extent of it.
When questioned by foreigners on the subject, the pride and
policy of the Burmans have always led them to exaggerate the
number; and it is not improbable that the former have sometimes
misapprehended the term lakh, which, throughout Ava and other
states to the eastward, signifies only 10,000 instead of 100,000.
The combined forces of the Bundtila, or general, whether at the
period of his investing Rangoon, or at any other, during the war,
did not, it is believed, exceed fifty thousand men of all descriptions;
but we may allow ten thousand for desertions as a maximum, and
another ten thousand for followers, who had to carry stores, ammu-
nition, &c., which, however, are only here admitted with the view of
elucidating the subject, and of conceding as much as can possibly
be expected by those who rate the populousness of the country
higher than here stated, even although not at so high a standard as
the writers alluded to have done.
During those prosperous periods when the Burmans felt little
resistance opposed to their ambitious career, it seldom happened
that to meet _the supply of men for any distant expedition they
found it requisite to levy more than one man from every third
house. One man from each fifth house was a common rate.
It cannot be doubted that the late war called into action every
able-bodied man in the empire, and that since the days of Alom-
nt&tdra or Alompra, the defensive resources of the country have
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never been so harshly experimented on. It is also known that
every serviceable man in the kingdom is registered, and that
although substitutes are admitted, and individuals may elude ser-
vice by paying a stipulated sum of money, yet that the population
is not so wealthy as to induce a belief that such measures are cal-
culated to weaken much any levy en masse.
It is likewise known that the Mdn, or original race of Pegu, had
not been altogether exempted from military service, and that if they
were not trusted to any great extent during the war, their labour
in the minor departments of the army was not dispensed with,1
It has been admitted, for the sake of argument, that the forces of
the Ava State amounted to 70,000 men of all ranks and descriptions,
and we may safely state the proportion of this number to the actual
population, as one in five, or one man for each house; this will
therefore give 350,000 souls for the population of Ava Proper and
Pegu. There is every reason to believe that the country to the
north-east of Pegu, including Martaban, does not contain, at the
utmost, more than 80,000 souls j and perhaps the remainder not
more than 100,000.
But as the Burmans did not implicitly trust the Mdns, and per-
mitted them to continue in some measure the labours of the field, on
which their own existence during the war in a great degree depended,
and as it may be supposed that they had not left all their frontier
posts defenceless, we may admit another 100,000 inhabitants
for the supply of the latter; or 20,000 fighting-men. To the
aggregate remains to be added the various Karean tribes scattered
over the country, which I loosely rate at 200,000 ; and the inhabit-
ants of such frontier provinces as have, from their distance from
the seat of power, been enabled now, as heretofore, to escape military
servitude. At a maximum, we shall take them at 100,000.
By this mode of reckoning, the whole of this vast region of
Ava Proper and Pegu will only be found to contain 930,000 inha-
bitants. Or the minimum may be rated at 900,000, and the
maximum at 1,000,000; a conclusion which may be retained,
perhaps, so long at least as no other data exist, from which clearer
inferences may be drawn.
Some Burman rolls picked up by me on the field at the attack
of Kokain in Pegu, immediately after the forcing of the Bundula's
lines, elucidate some part of the foregoing details.2
The columns are ruled out in the originals, and accurately
1
 From information obtained at Martaban, Pegu, &c.
2
 The rolls alluded to are in my possession.
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preserved. The names of the chiefs and the men, the relatives
of both, their districts and villages, and the quantity and quality of
military stores, money, &c, served out to them, are minutely noted
down.
When the Bundula was signally defeated, and driven by thirteen
hundred British out of this strong position, he had not, assuredly,
more than ten thousand men whom he could rely on to defend it;
the rest were seen to withdraw before the attack commenced.
Amongst the prisoners on this occasion, were boys of ten or
twelve years of age, whom the miserable parents, the victims of
oppression, had been forced to drag with them from their houses,
to assist in carrying stores.
The Burmans are expert in the choice of strong positions.
Nothing could [have been more judicious, and for a nation like
them, not very far advanced in civilization, more scientific, than the
selection of ground for the investing of Rangoon. They occupied
a line, which, could they have maintained it, must have cut off every
communication of the British army. The Burmans make, in their
wars, regular approaches, like the Siamese, by trenching.1
Nothing has more served to convince the Burmans of their in-
feriority in the field, and also behind a stockade, in the presence
of British troops, than the dreadful practice which the howitzers
made on them at different periods. The unerring effects of these,
and to them the serious novelty, of Congreve's rockets, joined to
the incomprehensible movements of the steam-vessels, and the
steady advance of the British troops, Europeans and sepoys, in
column or line, up to their strongest works, sometimes without
firing a shot, and generally without firing until each ball told death,
have made an impression on the minds of the Burman private
soldiery, which ages are not likely entirely to efface, andjhave furnished
materials for a tale which subsequent generations of Indo-Chinese
will read with awe. Yet the court, and its ministers, its governors,
and war-chiefs, profess to have learned a good lesson in the military
art, and betray no fear; and so long as the sinews of government
hold together, the fears of the multitude will be concealed by them,
and wielded to their own purposes.
When the war had but commenced, the Burmans looked on our
sepoys with contempt; and they even beheld European troops with
indifference. The first impression was owing to their confidence in
1
 A curious Siamese history is in my possession in which the art is treated of;
and a variety of adventures related which befell two rival Indo-Chinese princes,
while digging to circumvent and entrap each other.
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superior muscular strength, and in the second instance they were
probably partly swayed by the same idea, and partly by an opinion
unfavourable to British prowess, derived from what they had
formerly observed, or had been led to believe existed, in the conduct
and demeanour of the individuals from various European countries
resident in Rangoon; who, whatever might have been their inward
sentiments, were obliged to repress any national or indignant feel-
ing in the presence of a Mytiwun or his minions.
They have since had sufficient cause to alter their opinions re-
garding both descriptions of troops when in the field. But their
pride revolts at conceding any degree of superiority to the native
troops, who are more closely allied to them in complexion and habits.
It cannot be denied with reference to mere animal strength, that sepoys
of the common standard height are certainly inferior to the Burmans,
and there is little doubt that many of the latter possess muscular
strength in an equal degree with Europeans. This plainly indicates
the necessity for great care being taken in the selection of sepoy
recruits, and there can be little doubt that men sufficiently athletic
physically to cope when armed, with Burmese or any other eastern
people, may be with some pains procured in India. In the open
plain, however, Burman troops are little better than a disorderly
assemblage of ill-clothed men, without any very distinguishing
badges, and totally unacquainted with the evolutions requisite for
the preservation and direction of large bodies, in face of a scientific
and manceuvreing enemy; ten thousand of them would not, in all
probability, stand a charge in the field, of a regiment of well-dis-
ciplined troops, whether European or native. They have left this
matter, and wisely so, to be questioned; but scarcely, one should
think, to be doubted. Had the termination of the war rested on
the result of one or more pitched battles in the plain, it must have
been over in a few months.
The following is the common arrangement of a Burman army
according to the information collected in their country.
The Bundula or commander-in-chief, has unlimited power over
his troops. His fiat is sufficient warrant for a military execution;
and it is well known that the late Bundula made an unrelenting use
of this prerogative, and that the almost last act of his life was the
decapitation of the commandant of his artillery, for permitting the
steam-vessel to pass the works of Dehnobyu.
The Chekk,he' and Nak,han, with a Bodaye", or Secretary, may
be deemed the staff of the Bundula. There are several B6 or officers,
who command indefinite numbers of men. The rest of the system is a
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decennary one; the army is divided into lacs,' or tens of thousands,
M tatmm, or thousands, and Id taya, or companies of one hundred
men each. Besides the superior B6 placed over the larger divisions,
each company is commanded by an inferior B6, or captain, and he
has under him two inferior Chekk,he", and also a Nak.han and his
assistant. The Tamil, who is a sort of quarter-master, has also
charge of military works. The TMi than M, or officers subordi-
nate to these, and the captain; every Id tache, or tenth part of a
company, is under the direction of an Akyat (or Akyaup) or non-
commissioned officer, and below him is a Tacha, whose duties re-
semble in most respects, those of an adjutant to a British regiment.
The Burmans place implicit faith in talismans and auguries.
The former are generally written upon sheets of gold or silver, when
it is intended that they shall, be inserted beneath the skin of the
person who is to wear them. These slips are about half an inch
square, and are most frequently introduced under the skin of the
arm. The operation of tattooing, which gives to the limbs an ap-
pearance of being clothed, is also an essential one for a Burman
soldier to undergo, as it is supposed to shield him from danger,
besides being a sign of manhood. He is not singular, however, in
this case, for all ranks 'are more or less tattooed. The Siamese
consider the practice as barbarous; but it is probable that pride,
and a wish to appear a perfectly distinct people from their hereditary
enemies, the Burmans, had induced them at some former period to
relinquish the custom; for the Laos or Lau nation, from whom
they branched off, still retain it. Several English officers out of
curiosity (for which some may think they paid dear,) underwent
the operation of tattooing on various parts of their persons. But as
the operators were not copiers of the graces, or very select in their
choice.of subjects, it happened that they produced representations
of the most motley groups of things, animate and inanimate. Some
of these would have made LinnEBus and Buffon, had,they been alive,
stand aghast at their ignorance of the productions of Ava forests,
and would now draw copiously on the faith of antiquarian societies.
Although the Burmans occupy a middle rank in the list of war-
like nations, yet the question naturally arises whether their inferio-
rity is not more owing to despotic institutions, than to mental or
physical incapacity; hence another question follows, Would the
Burmans and M6ns (or Peguers) make good soldiers if disciplined
in the European manner ?
^ A satisfactory reply to this last question would likewise solve the
1
 Agreeable to their mode of reckoning, as before noticed.
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first; but we have nothing deduced from experience on which we
can safely rest an opinion, and must therefore draw inferences from
a general view of moral and physical peculiarities observable in the
people alluded to.
In so far as religion and morals are concerned, the Burmans
and. M<5ns stand nearly upon an equal footing; to the first they are
firmly, but not bigotedly, attached, and in their morals they are
opon a level with most Indian nations. This may not appear the
case to a superficial observer, who may be inclined to attribute to
them more vices than to the natives of Hindustan, because he is not
aware that they take less pains to conceal them than the latter.
Their religion is free from the prejudices of caste, and none of its
ordinances interdict any one from following the profession of arms.
It is true that the shedding of blood is positively forbidden by the
Buddhist religious code; but with these people custom, supported
by pride and passion, has produced the strange anomaly, that while
scrupulously refraining from bestial sacrifices, either for sacred pur-
poses or for food, they, like the Siamese, feel no compunction in
taking away the life of a human being for a very trivial civil offence,
or in the pursuit of ambition and revenge. Their conduct in these
respects, and in war, contrasts strongly with their behaviour in
private life. Fond of innocent amusements, much attached to their
families and relations, free and hospitable in their social intercourse,
many of their errors may well be attributed to the defects and vices
in their government.
There is no military caste amongst the Burmans or Mdns, nor are
their youth trained systematically to exercises which tend to foster
a martial spirit, if we except the forced- duty they have to perform
under the conscription system. The latter are more patient of toil
than the former, and possessed of greater bodily strength to sup-
port it. In robustness of frame they surpass any people seen by
me eastward of India, with the exception of the Chinese, and several
tribes of the Kareans. It is by no means certain that the settled
Kareans with these advantages would prove more tractable as
soldiers than the Burmans. Their habits are decidedly agricultural;
and their long subjection to Burman rule seems to have tinged their
minds with some of the vices or faults inseparable from abject sub-
mission. These may be gradually overcome by mild institutions,
but they at present check the spirit which entitles a soldier to the
confidence of a government. Like the Malay, a M<5n or Burman
often prefers a pittance procured by a little exertion, to good wages
obtained by steady labour. Rice also is so abundant and cheap
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throughout Pegu, and along the Tennasserim coast, that a family-
consisting of five persons' may be well clothed and subsisted for a
year, for eighty rupees, and even for less.
The unsettled Karean tribes are not more fitted than the Mdns
for the profession of arms ; and were they otherwise, their wander-
ing habits and impatience of control would preclude them from
being useful as soldiers. They are, however, reckoned individually
brave.
There is this one point of view, at least, in which the preference
may be given to the Mdns before the Burmans, with reference to
any probability which may exist of their ever being introduced into
the British army; that as the feeling which bound them to their
own line of kings has been nearly lost, they are prepared to obey
any authority which superior strength may place over them, and
chiefly that authority which may seem to open to them a prospect
of escaping from Burman rule. The bulk of the population yet
retains a deeply-rooted hatred of the Burmans, and in so far as can
be now perceived, might be used against them with advantage in the
shape of irregular troops. As, however, a considerable portion of
Peguers are connected by marriage and other ties with the Burman
population in their country, these might, perhaps, lean to the latter,
or be indifferent where exertion would be required to act against
them.
If an experiment were ever to be made with any of the classes
alluded to, with the intention of forming them into regular troops,
it would be quite indispensable that they be taken from their homes
at an early period of life. They might then, like the Malays who
formed a regiment at Ceylon, make useful soldiers in a close
country, and perhaps on the plain.
The peculiar locality of the ceded half of Martaban, close on the
frontier of two of the most powerful Indo-Chinese states, whose
mutual dislike to the British may render each dangerous in its turn,
and may even lead at some favourable period to their temporary
coalescence for aggressive purposes, will of course call for a corre-
sponding degree of foresight in those who may have charge of the
British position, and an adequate number of troops for its defence.
All that is now wanted is the separation of the M6ns or Peguans
from Ava, but it is very doubtful if their ability will keep pace at
any time with their inclination to assert independence, or if a suffi-
ciency be left of that spirit which led them once to give laws to the
Burmans.
1
 Allowing for three grown-up persons.
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Tennasserim being a narrow strip of land, bounded everywhere
on the east by the Siamese territory, would in times of war require
a much larger portion of troops for its complete defence than a
country of greater extent, but more compact, would demand in the
vicinity of such a power. The dividing barrier of mountains is so
wild, and the skirts of these on the west side are so destitute of
fixed inhabitants, that a Siamese army might invade the coast of
Tennasserim before any information could reach the British forces
in their several stations. They might build light boats at or near
the sources of the Tennasserim rivers or their branches, and pass
rapidly down to the sea; and they have the maze of Islands betwixt
Mergui and their own portion of the coast to shelter them, and
aid a retreat when required. They are not, it must be noticed, a
seafaring people; and will never venture to cope with any European
force on salt water, although it is possible, that with a great supe-
riority in numbers, they might do so in the smooth river. We
may, perhaps, rely on the Siamese remaining peaceful neighbours,
so long as they refrain from intriguing with the Indo-Chinese, or
with European powers, so long as they shall see an ascendency in
the Malacca Straits, and our superiority in position and military
power over the Burmans j and also while they find it prudent to
look on the Burmans as an enemy only dormant through the
effect of circumstances, not inclination.
CHAPTER XII.
POLITICAL SITUATION OP THE INDO-CHINESE STATES, GENERALLY CONSIDERED WITH
REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH POWER. POLITICAL SITUATION OP THE BRITISH IN
THB STRAITS OP MALACCA, WITH REFERENCE TO LOWER SUM AND MALAYAN
STATES. SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY.
THE subjugation of Keddah by the Siamese, and their late intrigues
at the Malayan State of Perak, both of which countries bound our
possessions, together with the recent insurrection in Tavoy Province,
which if not directly instigated, has assuredly been countenanced by
the Burman Court, naturally lead to some reflections on our former
political relations, and on the probable future results of our existing
ones, with both that Court and Siam. With reference to the former,
it might have been expected that the change from a harsh despotic
rule, to one so temperately restrictive as that of the British, would
have placed the Tavoyers in a state of repose and comfort to which
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they and their ancestors had ever been strangers. And the enlight-
ened and humane policy of the supreme government towards them,
in common with the other natives of the ceded territory, when carried
into operation by the chief local British authority'/whose experience
and proper feeling towards the natives are well known, ought to have
secured their attachment, and hastened their improvement in the
social scale. To what, therefore, so unlooked-for a state of things
has been owing, remains to be shown.
If the Ava court was not the instigator, they may have enter-
tained over sanguine ideas of the advantages to be conceded to them;
or the new and strange feelings engendered by the unwonted freedom
they have enjoyed, may perhaps have urged them to make an intem-
perate use of that liberty. It is probable, too, that some of the
minutiae in the local details under inferior native officers, may have
been unpalatable from their novelty.
The direct views of Maungda, the Chief of the insurrection, can-
not easily be conjectured, unless under the supposition that he acted
in the hope of support from Ava. But his communication with Aya
was apparently cut off by the force at Amherst; and the territory
of Siam bounded his prospects on the south and east.
Of this, however, he might have been sure, that a rebellion,
whether successful or otherwise, could not have failed to gain him
high favour at Court: and his followers, doubtless the most turbulent
class of the population, were certain (as the sequel has shown) of
enriching themselves by the plunder of the British officers and others.
The local assistant to the Commissioner2 very promptly stopped
the insurrection. A reward was offered to those who would seize
Maungda, and assist in restoring quiet. The small party of sepoys were
again marched into the town without any very material opposition,
and Maungda and his principal adherents were tried and executed.*
1
 Mr. Maingy. 2 Major Burney.
8
 Since the above was written, it has been discovered that the alleged cause of
the revolt, the revenue arrangements, put forth by the Chief Maungda as an excuse
for his rebellion, cannot be admitted; since it is known that this revolt was a
partial one, and was confined to a refractory and seditious set of men, who paid
hardly any revenue, and who expected to be great gamers by a change.
Maungda was well known to have been a traitor on several occasions to his own
government; and those who joined him in this last attempt had been for the most
part officers of the Burman government. The lower classes were overawed after
having seen our troops evacuate the town. Had the officer in immediate charge at
the time been sufficiently experienced (for he was only acting in the absence of
Major Burney), the affair would not have proceeded to the extremity it did. By
not instantly seizing Maungda and the other ringleaders, and remaining in the town,
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Reverting to the character for fickleness which the inhabitants
of the town of Tavoy have long borne, and to this event before us,
the inference is obvious ;—that the British local authorities are sub-
ject to be sold in their turn to the highest bidder, whether Burraan
or Siamese. Treachery is always strong for a season, and can never
he effectually guarded against, however possible it may be afterwards
to visit the authors of it with exemplary punishment.
The laws which self-interest has rendered in a great measure
reciprocally binding on European nations, carry little weight along
with them when forced on the anomalous field of India, both within
and beyond the Ganges, where they are not understood. Natural
obstacles, such as mountains and deserts, have ever in these regions
been the only ones to aggrandizement. No balance of power could
ever be long maintained amongst a number of dissimilar states and
tribes, all thirsting for supremacy, but by the intervention of a
people, able by themselves alone to direct and control the whole.
Events have shown also, that the policy which, from their peculiarity
of situation in India, the British have there pursued for a consider-
able number of years back, and which necessity, if not reason, fully
justifies, is quite inapplicable to Indo-Chinese nations in their present
stage of civilization.
India has been from remote times more or less connected with
the hardier races of the West j and her princes and people have had
frequent opportunities of determining with a pretty fair degree of
accuracy their relative rank amongst the nations on the globe. The
Indo-Chinese states, on the other hand, have only admitted a very
limited intercourse betwixt them and Europeans, and other western
foreigners. Hence their ignorance of their true position. But their
pride transcends their ignorance,—and both together would at any
time be sufficient, under apparently promising circumstances, to urge
them to brave destruction. Their intercourse with Europeans has
been, until very lately, purely commercial: and individual private
every advantage was given to them. That this might easily have been done isquite
evident from the fact, that the same force which thus evacuated the town retook
it six days afterwards, although Maungda and his followers had increased from a
handful of men to about 1300 strong, and had teen enabled to collect guns, jinjals,
ammunition, and other means of offence and defence, in which they were before
wanting.
The execution of Maungda and his principal adherents was fully merited by
them. I t will also have the salutary effect of rescuing the people from those
retaliative measures, with which that chief or his associates would have visited
them, in the event of these provinces being given up.
I t came out on the trials that Maungda was in correspondence with the Court
of Ava.
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traders in these latitudes are, we know, the very worst preservers, in,
their own persons, of national honour, as far as contempt of our
power is concerned : their safety and their success alike depending
on their holding out the olive branch under every variety of usage:
and on an unconditional compliance with local prejudices, and
perhaps with repulsive customs.
European nations are, in point of intelligence, nearly on a footing
of equality amongst themselves,—and their acts are so far mutually
binding. The Indo-Chinese states, or people, on the contrary, are
not only deficient in knowledge, but totally wanting in political and
national integrity. In national integrity they are deficient, because
they live under ignorant despotisms, where there are no tests of
public opinion. European nations have such tests for their general
guidance, even where despotic .principles prevail, to which to appeal
in cases of need; but amongst the native powers of India and
Indo-China to what public or political umpires shall a case be sub-
mitted by them, unless to those which are set up by self-interest
and the passions.
Any European power which should enter into a formal treaty
with a first-rate Indo-Chinese one, must either do so under a deter-
mination to keep it no longer than may be convenient, or be con-
tented to throw the weight of advantages into the scale of the latter.
The native chief knows and profits to its fullest extent by the good
faith of his European ally, who must wait patiently under every
tergiversation and proud bearing of the former, until some positive
act of aggression, or breach of the treaty, on his part, dissolves the
contract. It is vain to suppose that a demi-barbarous nation, pos-
sessing the power to annoy, will refrain from using it when time
shall serve. The inclination, at least, to do so accompanies power,
as a shadow does the substance. The tendency to domination is
inherent in the human mind, and the bias is closely linked with the
instinct of self-preservation. International laws may control|andj5ti8e,
or suppress the propensity, but can never totally eradicate it,—just
as particular codes of law apply to and restrain the other passions.
It has only been within the space of a few years, that the promi-
nent Indo-Chinese nations have begun to evince some small share
of respect towards the British. Had Ava, however, not experienced
in some degree the severity of deserved infliction during the late
war, our situation might have been widely different from what it
now is ; our Indian neighbours would have, at the least, suspected
that our power was yet vulnerable; the Siamese would have
estranged themselves from those whose friendship would have beea
H 2
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then incompatible with their remaining at peace with Ava, and
might have even menaced our straits and possessions. Had we been
driven out of Burma, the British name would have instantly fallen,
and much below par, in estimation, from the plains of Hindustan
and the wide regions of the Indo-Chinese to China, and might have
furnished subjects for the vehement vituperation of tea consumers
and tea coteries in Europe.
While victory had not yet declared decidedly for our arms in
Ava, the Siamese had entered into treaties with us; but, as before
alluded to, they seemed by their subsequent conduct to consider
such a measure as a sort of temporary safety-valve, which might be
shut at pleasure. They, no doubt, bitterly regret now the lost
opportunity of sharing in the ceded territory, a considerable portion
of which was once their own.
Not having, therefore, gained anything directly by the war, a
contingency they evidently did not anticipate when they condescended
to treat, it is not reasonable that the British should expect con-
cessions, political or commercial, from them as to a favoured nation.
They must be viewed as a people who, aware of their own duplicity,
are constantly on the alert to construe every movement of ours,
however trivial, into an indication of hostile intentions. Every suc-
cessive year almost, since 1822, has been marked by alarms, real
or pretended, on their side, and measures to counteract the effects
of these alarms on our part. With such feelings of distrust, so
foreign to those of true allies, working in the minds of the Siamese
court and governors of provinces, it may, perhaps, hereafter become
the safest, and least involving, mode of procedure, to abstain from
further very close federal alliances with them,—or, indeed, with
any other Indo-Chinese state. Their fears would then be the best
guarantee of the public peace, and would render them circumspect.
Under any circumstances it cannot be expected that the proud court
of Bankok, the " Seat of the Gods," as they term it, will swerve from
its ancient councils, or be led to betray its own weakness by any
unwonted concessions iu favour of British trade and influence. A
proud perversity of spirit will make it cling closer to ancient prin-
ciples, and leave no field on which enlightened philanthropy or calm
philosophy can labour with advantage, or policy calculate with any
degree of certainty. Her commerce with China renders Siam less
dependent on, or ambitious of, European traders than is generally
supposed; and she will be more likely to concede commercial
advantages to, or even to league with, a distant power, than to one
already in contact with a long extent of her frontier.
CAPTAIN LOW'S HISTORY OF TENNASSERIM. 89
The diminished influence of British merchants at the port of
Siam will amply justify these remarks. If we must, therefore, have
an extensive trade with it, one of two alternatives remains,—either
to compel it to grant what is equally its interest to give as that of
the British merchant to receive, or to gratify its self-love and ambi-
tion by mercantile, perhaps political, compliances which cannot be
made without national discredit.
Siam would be equally exposed to punishment, whether that
were to be called for by the infraction of a treaty, or by an aggres-
sion, where a treaty might not exist.
Ignorant as the Siamese affect to be, or really are, of the extent
of British power, they are still a cautious and deliberative people; and
in the main, and within their own circle of ideas, keen and pene-
trating politicians, rarely permitting the most deeply-rooted hatred,
or an intemperate thirst of dominion, to betray them into precipitate
measures. They may act on false principles, but they prepare well
for what these may impel them to. Within their confined political
horizon their understanding may be addressed ; but both within it
and beyond it, an appeal to their fears is likely to prove most
advantageous. That they know what is morally right might fairly
be inferred from a perusal of their national and naturalized litera-
ture, and from their religious and legislative codes. The examples and
precepts, however, which these unfold or inculcate, may after all
act but feebly on the current of society.
The repressed feelings of the court of Ava can hardly be mis-
construed. That it received a wholesome check is true ; but, as
previously noticed, its institutions have not been impaired, nor have
its population and resources been so far diminished, that they may
not be restored to more than pristine vigour in a few years. The
place of the old arms taken from them will soon also be supplied
by new ones obtained from trading vessels. Both contending parties
have been gainers, in fact, by the experience of two campaigns,
the most discouraging, not to use a stronger term, that English
and Sepoy troops were ever engaged in together. The British,
headed by a general of uncommon perseverance, overcame the
numerous difficulties of country and climate, in the face of an active
enemy, more, perhaps, by their innate spirit and their moral ener-
gies, than by discipline as regards field movements; which last, in
a jungle, is of little avail. They patiently endured privations, to
which few regular armies in any country are subjected ; and they
carried with them, from the close of a triumphant contest, a know-
ledge of those roads, rivers, and channels, by which the pedestal of
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the golden-feet may, on any future occasion of aggression from that
quarter, be most expeditiously and surely assailed. The Burmans,
on the other hand, were led on by a Bundtila' of undisputed
ability and activity, joined to a boldness which merited a
milder fate than it was his lot to meet. The Burmans have not
only felt—what was quite new to them—the steel of a superior
enemy, but have had the sense to profit by their experience ; and
could they but establish a nucleus of a regular army, by the aid of
Europeans inimical to the British influence—an object at which
they are, it seems, as before adverted to, now aiming—it were diffi-
cult to decide to what dangerous purposes the capabilities of such a
people might not be applied.
The war, too, has forcibly elucidated that wise political maxim,
not to despise an enemy, however contemptible or barbarous he
may seem. It is instructive to read the older European accounts of
Burman and Peguan wars, and the opinions of the writers, so un-
favourable to the prowess of these people, and to compare them
•with later realities. Had such vague descriptions of the Burmans,
given by writers who could not have known their real strength,
been fully credited by the British authorities, we might have entered
into the war with a handful of men, instead of a well-organized
army of thirty thousand troops, and should, consequently, have been
defeated ; and we should have learned, when too late, that although
very high, or even very stubborn, courage may be wanting in an
enemy, yet, that nature may lend to his superior numbers her
tangled shield of brakes, rocks, hills, and waters, to level distinc-
tions.
If the court of Ava should ever again throw down the gauntlet,
we know to what points her forces will be directed. To regain her
lost provinces in Arracan, Assam, and Tennasserim, will no doubt
be a primary object; and were she to conduct the requisite pre-
liminaries with that degree of secresy for which the Indo-Chinese
are remarkable, our positions in the ceded territories might be
attacked suddenly and simultaneously. The people of these terri-
tories would be incited to rebellion ; and the cupidity or fears" of
the Siamese would be administered to as formerly, or excited, so as
to induce their co-operation. The feelings of Indian states would,
without fail, be probed, and China would be flattered by unusual
marks of friendship, or by proffered vassalage. It would then
remain probably for the British authorities to decide at once, either
1
 He was killed by a shell when superintending the operations at Denobyu.
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to abandon the conquered provinces, or to save them ; and perhaps
at the same time to operate a diversion of any meditated attack on
the Bengal frontier, or on our Straits' possessions with Siamese aid,
by carrying the war into the centre of Ava. The inconvenience and
expense of a defensive system on such a crisis, at such a distance from
our resources, would, in the long run, equal, if not exceed, that of
an offensive one, and would certainly be less creditable to our arms.
Were the latter alternative to be adopted, a column might pene-
trate directly from Arracan towards the capital; another might
occupy Rangoon; and parties could be sent by sea to seize on
Bassein and Martaban, while Assam could be also provided for as
circumstances might warrant.
To secure Pegu at once, it would be required to occupy a line
across the country, the centre resting at the memorable post of
Denobyti ; which last, with Rangoon, would require to be sufficiently
fortified to resist Burman attacks.
The Peguers, by this time, might be completely under our rule;
and as they could be assured of permanent emancipation from the
Burman yoke, the whole energies of the population would be dis-
posable for assisting in the war; and the revenue of the country
would also be available. Supposing the Ava column to have reached
that capital, it might, if permanent occupation of Ava should not be
desirable, remain there until a heavy mulct should be collected,
including a disarming of the population to such an extent as policy,
guided by humanity, would dictate. It would now be only required
to give the final blow to the ambition of this aspiring state; by
causing it to give up all claims for ever, on Arracan, Assam, and
Pegu, (the latter including Martaban and the Tennasserim coast).
Thus it would be confined to its original form and^boundaries, and
would only be left at liberty to waste its energies, and to prosecute
ambitious projects in the countries bordering on China and Siam. It
would also then find it more difncult than hitherto to obtain Supplies
of fire-arms. A Consul at Ava, should such an officer be thought
necessary, might watch, of course, the movements of the court; and
the keys of the country being in our possession, and the navigation
of the rivers of Pegu kept open by steamers, the golden Foot would
soon, or, at least, his subjects would, find it best to submit quietly
to the new order of things. Indeed, it would be difficult for
the Burmans to exist without an intercourse with Pegu and Arra-
can ; advanced as they are in civilization, and accustomed to foreign
trade; and since it is from Pegu that they receive most of the salt
and rice consumed in the country.
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They would soon find it their interest then to encourage a trade
with the ceded ports; and a more close intercourse with Europeans
might probably create in them wants which our manufactures could
supply. The ancient line of Peguan princes being, if not nearly
extinct, yet sunk in consequence, it would not be requisite perhaps to
set up a chief of that nation in Pegu. By ruling Pegu as an Indian
province, and with the aid of a strong Peguan police, the safety of
all parties would be best consulted, and the full revenue of that
territory would be directly leviable.
Should Siam aid the Burmans in the conflict, her numerous sea-
ports, Bankok in particular, lie wide open for any summary infliction
she might deserve. But should she prove an active ally, for becom-
ing which a certain degree of peculiar political training would be
required, or a neutral power, in either case it would remain to be
considered whether she might not be led to exchange possessions at
the northern entrance of the Malacca straits, for some portion of the
Tennasserim coast. Thus Junkceylon, if given to us, would form
an excellent connecting link betwixt our Burman and Straits' posses-
sions ; and the Malayan state of Keddah, if also ceded, might
enable the British to restore to its former R&ja his robbed singhasana1,
and to place Siam almost beyond the pale of Straits' politics in time
to come.
By possessing Junkceylon, we should control the coast, so as to
check piracies, obtain rich tin-mines, and probably induce a little
trade in that quarter. The people of that island, judging from the
reception given to me there in 1824, and from their conversation
then, have every wish to come under our sway. The focus of faction
being removed so far off as Upper Ava, from the Tennasserim coast,
the provinces there might easily be retained, either by placing
Peguan or other native officers, not Burman, at their head, as mere
collectors of revenue, aided by a native militia, or police, and a party
of troops under a British officer, who might dispense justice to
the people, and control the native collectors j or by a small British
establishment of civil and military.
! If any part of this coast were to be given up under such circum-
stances as have here been supposed, to the Siamese, Tavoy, perhaps,
might be thought least objectionable, even although it yields most
revenue. The Siamese would then be shut out from Pegu;
where, owing to former alliances, and to the number of soldiers of
that nation in their army, they might be disposed to intrigue. It is
1
 The Malayan title for a throne.
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known that while "the Burman war yet pended, they harboured a
refugee scion of the Pegu royal stock, or a pretended one, with the
intention of supporting his claims for theii own advantage, had an
opening occurred. Mergui, as a port for supplying and refitting
ships, exceeds by far in value any other on the Tennasserim coast.
That it wants population may be deemed an objection: but where
property is under the safeguard of a British station, this defect will
always in due time remedy itself.
If a little knowledge too frequently betrays its possessor into error,
a little power is no less dangerous to the individual or to the many
who wield it, when the means of increasing it lie within reach. But
when the barrier has been leaped, and the first danger has been
overcome, new principles come into play. Among the eastern
nations, and particularly amongst the Chinese and Indo-Chinese, if
you have the power, you will gain no credit; perhaps be despised
and insulted for neglecting, or refraining, from politic or humane
motives, to use it 5 and their pretensions will rise in proportion to
your forbearance.
The British Government1 did not surely manifest any cupidity
for territorial acquisitions after the contest with Ava; for adverting
to what this war, so pertinaciously thrust upon us by the court of
Ava, cost in men" and treasure, much more valuable concessions
might with justice, perhaps, have been exacted. A few years have
been sufficient to prove that the British might even have retained
Pegu, without having run the risk of being thought more ambitious
than they now seem to be to the Indo-Chinese nations, who have
been long tutored to consider no power as substantial, which does
not affect and come home, in some shape, to each individually. Our
deeds in Ava seem to them, and to the distant Malayan tribes, like
the pageants of romance,—short and brilliant. They are dazzled
by the strange light: but it is inadequate to dispel entirely the
lurking suspicion, that the power which has (so magnanimously,
certainly) relinquished an empire within its grasp, is incapable of
retaining it, or, as they would express themselves, that it resembles
a torrent which ravages for a season the plain, but is unsustained
by a copious fountain at its source. These sentiments are literally
those which have been gathered from natives of several of the
countries alluded to, and not theories of my own.
1
 The expression, "British Government," here and elsewhere used in this
work, is perfectly applicable; although the local administration be that of the
East India Company; for other nations naturally look to the fountain of power for
the responsibility attached to the local exercise of it.
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It is surely time that Britain should not mistake, or wish others
to misconstrue, the footing on which her eastern empire rests. No
one with a sound perception of the past can well dispute that it must
be kept by the sword which took it; and that, however we may plume
ourselves on the influence of the beneficent institutions, the temperate
freedom, purity of justice, and the exemption from the inflictions of
war and bigotry, which have accrued or been granted to our eastern
subjects; and however calculated these may be to hand down on the
enduring tablet of the human mind to future times, our moral and
political greatness; yet that there will always exist in the breasts
of the dispossessed Ishmaelites, and of the influential princes and
their subjects, a smothered spirit, jealous and repulsive of our power.
The glorious administration of the Marquis of Hastings dispelled
the mirage which had so long dimmed the political horizon of India.
His master mind led him to spring a mine in the enemy's strong
holds before the latter could mature his plans : and the subsequent
events showed that extension was then the best safeguard of our
power; when conducted with a tempered judgment, and prosecuted
by unceasing activity. Extension is certainly a term of vague
import: but as applicable to India, it must be supposed to have a
limit; and there are circumstances in the geographical features
of this portion of the globe, and in the moral and physical aspect
of several of its nations and tribes, which, to the reflecting mind of
any one acquainted with them, will perhaps suggest a boundary
beyond which, were it possible, it would be madness to advance.
Towards this barrier, if it has not been already reached, an
advance might indeed be fraught with ruin, were the means wanting
by which the mighty Indian fabric of power has been built up and
consolidated. But as such means are yet, and, it is to be hoped, will
long continue, at hand, and are growing with our power, any advance
which may be rendered imperious by the menacing attitude of native
states, will only serve to strengthen, on the principle that an enemy
is safer at a distance, than when thundering at our gates ; that a
defensive system is always encouraging to him, since he construes it
into weakness ; and that to retreat is immeasurably more perilous
than to advance.
The history of nations will convince us that our Eastern Empire
must have a termination ; although circumstances might perhaps
warrant our throwing that period far on into futurity. However
contented we may be with what we already possess, and however
anxious we may feel to maintain our ground, necessity may yet
compel us to proceed, lest the tide of fate should turn before we have
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completed the mighty march. When a flood has been by any
catastrophe suddenly checked, or has exhausted itself, and the accu-
mulated waters begin to roll back, every puny rivulet hastens with
the utmost vigour to accelerate the retrogression.
With regard to the Indo-Chinese regions, extensive territorial
acquisitions in their interior may never be of importance to Britain,
situated as she now is. They are poor, compared with Indian
countries, and in comparison also with them, are scantily peopled;
and their kings, and chiefs, and their subjects, cannot be moulded,
ordered, or guided, by those maxims of policy best fitted for India.
If any of these nations insult us, they can be taught their proper
distance ; and should they proceed to such extremities, as to provoke
us to occupy any of their trading sea-ports, these will, if it should
be desired, naturally connect themselves with those mercantile zones,
with which the enterprise of the British nation has already nearly
girded the world; and which add elasticity and stability to our
power.
LOWER SIAM—LIGOU.
THE State of Ligor is one which chiefly obtrudes itself on the
British Government with reference to its possessions in the Straits
of Malacca.
Although much dilapidated, the town exhibits traces of its
former flourishing state. It is defended by a very ruinous brick
fortification, of an oblong shape, about 700 yards long, by 250 or 300
broad, the wall of which where uninjured is from twelve to twenty
feet high. Loubere relates, that a governor of that province would
not allow a French engineer (who had been sent by the King of
Siam to survey it) to walk round the fort in less time than three
days,—a silly species of parade not unfrequently practised by Indo-
Chinese princes to enhance the fame of their cities.
The principal part of the town lies within the fortification;
the access to which is across a wet ditch on the north, and a
dry one, or partly so, on the south. A small river, of the same
name as the town, protects it on the north-west. The only
buildings of any note are the temples, several of which are hand-
gome ; and the two termed Phihan Lo-ang and Wat Pradiim are
venerated above the rest on account of their age. This cannot,
however, be great, as the superstructure is chiefly composed of
wood. There are many others scattered over the country.
This region is neither well peopled nor cultivated. The number
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of its inhabitants cannot be rated at upwards of 20,000 souls ; but,
with the provinces of Sangora, Trang, and Daliing, the total Siamese
subjects of the Ligorean may be taken at 70,000 souls.
The situation of its Phraya or Governor has been hereditary,
when not subverted by faction or mal-administration ; it depends,
however, entirely on the capacity of the successor-apparent whether
his claim shall be admitted by the court of Siam or otherwise, and
it is plain, from all that has passed within the last few years, that
the power of the Phraya is checked, and, when necessary, suspended,
or rendered nugatory, by a council of several chiefs appointed by
the Emperor of Siam to reside at Ligor.
Whatever the actual power may be, which the Siamese court
has hitherto delegated to the Phraya, it is evident from his whole
proceedings, since 1822, that no curb was put on his ambition, and
that his enterprising disposition was flattered and encouraged by
the emperor.
The invasion and subsequent occupation of Keddah by the
Siamese, in the year 1S22, under the command of the Phraya,
joined to the subsequent intrigues of that chief with disaffected
individuals in the smaller state of Perak, leave no room to doubt
the strong desire which prevailed in the court of Siam to extend its
power over the whole peninsula of Malacca '. Circumstanced, there-
fore, as the British possessions are on that peninsula, it becomes an
object of some importance to ascertain the real strength and re-
sources of the Siamese generally, and particularly of the Phraya,
and the degree of suspicion with which the latter ought to be viewed.
The former subject has been already discussed ; and, before endea-
vouring to discuss the latter, it may be proper to advert to the
claims which the Siamese thrust forward to the sovereignty, not
only of Keddah, and, par consequence, of the British settlement of
Penang, and of Perak 2, but of the whole peninsula down to Malacca
inclusive; and which, although they may allow them to lie dormant
for a season, will be resumed on some future and fitting occasion.
It would appear that the Siamese had, on several occasions, overrun
these countries, but that they had at length been contented to
receive mere acknowledgements of respect from their several princes,
under the denominations generally of Ddk Mai ngun Thdng, meaning
" gold and silver flowers."
1
 The Siamese, so long ago as 1511, claimed Malacca from Albuquerque.
s
 A Malayan state, bounding the British territory of Wellesley Province at
the Krean river, on the south.
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' *• Pcrak is perhaps the last of the states alluded to which yielded
this unwilling acknowledgement of inferiority; and as it only hap-
pened two or three years ago, it was, we may suppose, the necessary
consequence of the termination of Dutch influence in that quarter.
Keddah was apparently one of the first peninsular rajaships which
was driven to the necessity of thus simply owning the supremacy
of Siam. It would seem that the first regular presentation by her
rajas' of the Bunga Amas, or " golden flower," took place about
one hundred years ago. Since then she has made several ineffectual
efforts to get rid of the obligation; and it has been partly owing to
an attempt of this kind, and partly to misunderstandings on other
subjects, that the Phraya, or governor, of Ligor considered himself
justified in expelling the raja from his country.
The Siamese cannot produce any proof that Keddah (with which
country the British had, until 1822, been connected by treaty, and
by mutual relations of amity) was ever considered as forming an
intrinsic part of their empire; nor was it even subject to Ligor at
the period when that country was conquered by Thatith&ng, a king
of Siam, as appears from the List of Tributaries contained in the
Ligor History,—a translation of which has been made by me, and
from which an extract will appear further on.
It is true, that the original inhabitants of Keddah, or at least
those existing immediately antecedent to the invasion by a colony
from Acheen, six hundred years ago, were of the Thai, or Siamese
race, which perhaps spread from Ligor or Patani after the settling
of the colony under Tkammasukkarat1, the reputed founder of the
Ligor state, and also that the present ex-raja of Keddah traces his
descent from a line of independent princes of that race. Siam was
then but an infant state sent forth from the nursery of Laos ; and
other small parties of the Laos may have branched off in different
directions, founding colonies where they settled. It was not until
long afterwards, that, feeling her strength to increase, Siam cast her
eyes on the provinces now called Lower Siam, and on Tannau, and
the coast south of Junkceylon inclusive.
It would be difficult to point out the country termed Awadi,
whence the colony alluded to emigrated; if, indeed, much of the
account regarding it is not fabulous. But as the journey occupied
more than seven months, we may suppose it to have been either the
1
 The Sanscrit scholar will here observe, that the natives of these regions had
long ago adopted Indian titles, this one being the name of a Hindu prince, Darma-
soka Said.
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territory of the Laos, or some other one where that people had esta-
blished themselves. It is also probable that it arrived from the
quarter of Pegu. Had the colony passed through Siam, its march
must have been known to the people, and could not have escaped
being recorded ; whereas it should seem that the fame of the pros-
perity of the new city was the first intimation which they had of
its existence.
The fact of the inhabitants of Keddah, therefore, having derived
their origin from Ligor, is by no means necessarily connected with
any claim which the court of Siam may choose to found on their
being of the same race with themselves. Besides, the character of
that population has been perfectly altered by an intermixture with
the various tribes of Malays, which have at different periods settled
in the country.
Prescription might be allowed, perhaps, to have given to that
court a loose title to ask a token of respect from the rajd of Keddah.
But since this mark of his weakness was exacted at first by force of
arms, it must have been a sense of inferiority and of inability to
assert his rights only, which could have excused a chief so situated
bearing with patience the degradation. Nor can the court of Siam,
after having punished his supposed contumacy, exhibit to the world
any just right permanently to occupy his country. As well may
China assume the direct sovereignty of Cochinchina, and several
other Indo-Chinese states, because she receives from them periodical
offerings as marks of her long-acknowledged superiority as a nation
over all of them '.
It would appear, that for the space of four hundred years subse-
quent to the conversion of the people of Keddah to Muhammedanism,
i. e., about five hundred years ago, its rajas paid little regard to
Siam; and a passage is here produced from the Siamese History of
Ligor, in which all the tributaries are mentioned, but amongst which
Keddah is not to be found. In this History it is related that, after
the construction of Pagodas there by ambassadors, from the
Kingdom of Hongsawady, or Pegu, (which must have been antecedent
to Burman influence in Pegu,) and in the fifth Siamese month, (or
beginning of the year,) all the princes of the petty states tributary
to Thammastikkarat, Prince of Ligor, (or Lakhan,) came either
voluntarily or on compulsion to Ligor to perform the ceremony of
1
 Every third year ambassadors go to Pekin from Siam, tearing a tree of gold
and another of silver, as marks of nominal vassalage. They assume the Chinese
dress.—Crawford's Siam.
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bathing the king,—such being the usual token of their homage.
[The actual ceremony was not performed. The chiefs only pre-
sented golden or other vessels filled with water.] The tributary
states were :—
On the East Coast, On the West Coast.
1. Kalentan 1. Trang
2. Sanga 2. Chalang, or Salang.
3. Theppha
4. Tha Thang
5. Tani [or Patany]
6. Nang Chik Chana-df
7. Songkhla (Sangora)
8. Chaiya, and
9. Patthalung.
An intelligent Buddhist priest informed me, that Junkceylon
was once under the dominion of the Javanese ; but Nai Ka, Lord
of Ligor, attacked and subjugated it on Wednesday in the twelfth
month of the 1916th year of the Buddhist period, or A. D. 1373.
The island was then termed Mu-ung Sunnakhanaam, or the
Dog General's Country, alluding to the name or title of a general
whose fame', was perpetuated by a statue of a dog erected on the
island to commemorate his successes.
But, were her titles to the sovereignty of the whole peninsula
clearly defined and indefeasible, yet would her ruthless measures in
war render a generous nation averse to witness [unmoved, humanity
and reason outraged, without being permitted to use the means at
hand to restrain the offenders.
The Ligorian army, which took Keddah, was an apt sample of
a reckless horde of barbarians. Fire and the axe followed their
desolating track ; and while their swords were stained in the blood
of an unprepared and flying population, the fields were laid waste,
and fruit-trees cut down in wantonness, or, as a Malay expressed
himself to me, the broom of destruction swept over the face of the
country.
, The unfortunate raja fled on an elephant, leaving the greatest
part of his family behind him ; and he was so closely pursued, that
he was forced to throw most of his treasure into a river, and to
scatter money on the road as he proceeded, to delay his pursuers.
It is true that the raja's country was unexpectedly attacked, and
that his subjects were unprepared for resistance; but it is not at all
certain that they would have successfully defended themselves, even
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had they been aware of the danger: for it would seem that the
Malays of Keddah are inferior in courage and enterprize to their
brethren further down the Straits, and it would also appear that
the raja had, by a system of finance, which threw his subjects
under the Chinese revenue-renters,"and also by an unlimited and
harsh exercise of his power, contributed to render himself rather
unpopular at the time. He had, besides, never chosen to keep, as
his brother kings in the Straits generally do, a sufficiently strong
band of regular troops in pay.
Flushed with victory, the Ligor Phraya ventured even to menace
the British settlement of Penang, and insolently to demand that the
RajS. of Keddah, who had sought protection there, should be forth-
with given up to him. Some of his troops also had the boldness
to cross the Muda river (the British boundary), and pillage the vil-
lages within the British territory,—a positive act of aggression, and
not to be attributed to ignorance.
The native population of Penang was thereby thrown into a con-
dition bordering on distraction, while their fears were industriously
fomented by a few Chinese who were favourably disposed to the
Siamese. Under such circumstances danger was more to be appre-
hended from within than from anything which the Ligorian could
do from without. The Siamese only blustered, however, and re-
turned to Keddah, where they fixed their head-quarters, and have
since fairly settled.
From a written Siamese account of the proceedings in Keddah
at that period, it would appear that the raja was in the habit of
occasionally supplying rice at the usual rate of payment for the
Siamese troops, and that he had refused to give any on a particular
occasion, besides withholding the biennial, sometimes triennial, pre-
sentation of a golden flower. But it is further stated, that, upon
the death of the last Phraya of Ligor, a prince of the royal blood of
Siam went to that province to grace by his presence the funeral
obsequies of the deceased. Those chiefs of the peninsula who had
been too weak hitherto to resist the demand for periodical presenta-
tions of golden flowers, were speedily summoned to attend. The
Phraya Srai, or Raja of Keddah, was informed that he was ex-
pected to wait in person, (although such a mark of vassalage seems
never to have been exacted anterior to this period).
The chiefs alluded to " either attended personally, or sent sub-
stitutes or commissioners to the presence of the prince. But the
Phraya Srai neither performed, nor sent any one in his place to per-
form this required act of homage. When the Phraya Thai, or King
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of Siam, was informed of the disrespect shown by the Phraya Srai
towards him, he directed the new Governor of Ligor to seize the
first favourable occasion to humble the Keddah Raya." The
Phraya of Ligor accordingly invaded, some years afterwards, and
took Keddah, as related.
This Phraya is the son of the famous P,hna Tak, a Chinese who
usurped the throne of Siam about fifty-six years ago, immediately
after the departure from that country of the Burmans, who had
invaded it, and carried off the royal family. The prince's mother
was*a Chinese. Tak was treacherously murdered by two generals
who aspired to restore the original dynasty. His wife was saved,
and sent as a present to the then Phraya of Ligor. She brought
forth a son a few months afterwards, who is the present P,hria.
It is probable that the Siamese- Court did not attach much blame to
Tak for his preferring a crown to his profession of a merchant,—
especially as the captivity of the royal family had left the govern-
ment without a head.
The Phraya, or Governor, has therefore no illustrious ancestry
to boast of, although he chooses to assume the titles appertaining
to the original Ligor dynasty. His letters addressed to me, while
envoy to his court, began thus :—" Phra na hoa Chau Than chau
P,hria Nak'hdn SI T,haramaraat Pho prasut;" which may be
rendered, " The illustrious Head—the Lord and Chief of exalted
degree—the princely Lord of Nakhan (or Ligor)—the noble T,ham-
maraat (the name of the first independent prince of Ligor), whose
mind is dignified and princely."
It is not intended here to discuss minutely the question regarding
the expediency or otherwise of the British neutrality observed on
the above occasion. The attack by the Siamese troops on Keddah
was so unexpected and sudden, that no time was allowed for a refer-
ence to the supreme British authority, by the local government of
Prince of Wales' Island. The evil was accomplished; and to have
remedied it by force of arms, the only mode left, must necessarily
have led to a war with Siam, or, at the least, with the Ligor chief.
It will be sufficient to observe, that conduct such as that displayed
by the Siamese towards the local government, would, under any
supposition but that of their being an ignorant and half-civilized
race, have merited due punishment.
The conquest of Keddah is to be regretted on many grounds.
All free trade witli its port is nearly wasted away: supplies from it
of grain, cattle, and poultry, for Penang, depend generally on the
temper which the Ligorean may happen to be in; and the avenues
VOL. IV. I
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to the tin-mines are blocked up. The remaining inhabitants of
Keddah are cruelly oppressed, and carried into slavery; agricul-
ture and trade are neglected by them: and the British have only
got a narrow river betwixt them and the Siamese territory, which
favours the escape of criminals from justice.
All trade across the Peninsula, excepting in cattle, has been laid
under restrictions equivalent to an abolition; for, it is plain, that
however formally they may make a show of permitting a free trading
intercourse with the Honourable Company's territory, yet they have
the means of rendering such license null, without detection: and as
to their allowing, or pretending to allow, Asiatics, not descended
from Europeans, to cross it for trade, it is no boon to the British;
since it is believed that the former class were never debarred the
privilege.
t A general disorganization amongst the native chiefs of the inte-
rior, down to Salengore, also took place at the period of the invasion,
and for several years subsequent to it. But the embassies sent to
Perak by the Penang government happily gave a check to its further
progress, and secured the independence of the Malayan states.1
It was a fortunate thing for the oppressed people of Keddah,
Patani, and other provinces, that the Penang government, then under
the Hon. Mr. Phillips, who took a lively interest in the prosperity
of the place, thought it expedient to settle the territory opposite to
the island on the main-land, which had long been ceded to the
British by a former Raja of Keddah.
This territory, termed Wellcsley Province, extends nearly thirty
miles in a north and south direction, with a breadth of about three
miles. Many advantages have accrued from the possession of it,
independent of the supplies of grain, cattle, and poultry, it yields to
Penang. The Siamese have been precluded from approaching by
land too close to the island, and from having an easy access to the
countries to the southward. The piratical bands, which formerly
found secure retreats in its creeks and rivers, have not molested the
native traders in the degree and manner they formerly did; and it
offers a sure market to the people of the interior, who could not
otherwise have brought down their tin, and other produce, the cattle
and poultry, &c, without risk. If any political arrangement should
ever restore the Rdja of Keddah to his rightful possessions, the
free and full control over the navigation of the rivers Muda and
Krean would be gained to us, by means of which the produce of
1
 The firat under John Anderson, Esq., of the Penang Civil Service; and the
last one under the writer of this account.
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many valuable tin-mines might be secured for the trade of Penang;
and a commercial communication opened across the Peninsula to
Patani, and other ports.1 This province might then (as it ought to
have been at first) be bounded by the hills which are its natural
frontier on the E., and be sustained by the two outflanking frontiers
of Keddah and Perak, whose safety would then depend on us. This
extension on the east, would confine the Siamese to the east side of
the great range of hills, and remove them altogether from Straits
politics. But the Siamese are as deeply interested in retaining Ked-
dah, and controlling the Perak state, as the British can be that they
should remove to a distance ; since these two would be admirable
positions for depots, to enable them to carry their ambitious schemes
into execution.
The total census of this province exhibits a fixed population of
25,043 souls. In this number there are 22,300 Malays, and 1,590
Chinese, and the rest is made up of people from Hindustan, Siam,
and other neighbouring regions. The males in the whole population
exceed the females by 1,772, which may be accounted for by the
number of persons who have fled from Keddah and Siam, leaving
their families behind ; and also from the comparative small number
of Chinese who are married. There are, as nearly as can be known,
betwixt the ages of fifteen and fifty years, 11,795 ; above fifty years,
3,781 ; below fifteen years, 9,467. Births during the year amount,
by the census, to 162, or 154th part of the population; and the
deaths were 128 ; the greatest part of the sufferers being children by
the small-pox. Both these numbers appear small, compared with
the population; but it is believed they are near the truth.8
The agricultural and proprietary class, of both sexes, consists of
about 18,000 souls. The other inhabitants are engaged in petty
trade, and in various other employments.
There are, in the whole population, 600 male and 500 female
debtors, (termed orang berhutang,) or persons who have sold their
services for a specific or unlimited time, always reserving the power
1
 It has been stated by an author, whose name does not occur to me at present,
that the Malacca Peninsula could not have been the golden Chersonese, because it
does not yield gold. This, however, is an error: many thousands of persons, both
Chinese and Malays, 'are annually employed in working the gold-mines of
Patani and Calentan. There used to be a considerable importation of gold-dust
from these to Penang; but, since the Siamese influence has prevailed down to the
fourth parallel of N. latitude, this trade has been destroyed.
2
 In Europe the same extent of population might require 800 births, at least—
while the deaths would probably be greater in many places.
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of freeing themselves by payment of the original debt, and what
may have been afterwards added to it. They are a very indolent
and fickle class of people.
There are now several large villages and bazars in the province.
The increase of the population during the year 1829, may be stated
at 1,860 souls. The births exceed the deaths only by thirty-four.
So that immigration has chiefly caused the above increase. Additions
are constantly being made in this way, from Keddah.
If the ratio of increase were to be calculated according to the
births, and these did not exceed greatly what they were last year,
it would require a long series of years to double the population.
Yet the nature of the bulk of the people is such as to induce the sup-
position, that the ratio of -multiplication will be rapidly increased,
particularly should the vaccine inoculation prove successful. Un-
fortunately, it did not succeed on several occasions, and the conse-
quence was a great mortality by the small-pox.
At present, there are about 288 souls for every square mile.
But it can be shown that where rice will grow well, and yield fair
crops, one square mile is capable of supporting 2,900 souls. So
that there is abundant room for a much larger population than now
exists.
The present rice-produce exceeds the consumption of the pro-
vince by about 250 koyans (5,323 lbs. English), although the culti-
vators of rice compose only a little more than two-thirds of the
•whole population. But there are many holders of dryland yielding
various descriptions of produce. Perhaps the province exhibits as
busy a scene as may be found in any Malayan country of similar
extent. When the labour of the fields is over, the ryot turns
fisher, or wood-cutter, or petty trader. The island of Penang is
almost wholly supplied too from this coast, with cattle, for draught
and slaughter, and with poultry, &c.
The annual value of every description of produce, according to
an estimate made by me, from minute returns, may be thus rated :
Specie Dollars.
Rice, 2000 koyans, at seventy dollars per koyan . . 140,000
Orchards—dry cultivation; including some pepper and sirih . 73,000
Ratans—dragon's blood, dammer oil . . . . 1 , 0 0 0
Sugar-cane and sugar
Cattle and poultry
Trifling manufactures, viz., cloth, leather, lime,
Fisheries, and turtles' eggs
Roofing-materials, and wood and fire-wood
70,000
28,000
bricks, charcoal 10,000
5,000
72,000
Milk, butter, and other smaller supplies, indigo and tobacco . 10,000
Total . . . 409,000
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It would be difficult, at present, to specify the real value of
fixed property. Land fit for cultivation is worth, to the proprietor
who farms on his own account, about 31.12s. the English acre j and,
calculating on the rental merely, its market-price is somewhat more
than four years' purchase, although it yields about twenty per cent,
on the capital. Dry land varies in value according to its quality
and situation, from a rupee to twenty dollars, and it only yields rent
in some favoured situations, and where the soil is rich, and adapted
for the growth of sugar, betel-leaf, and other valuable produce.
But it would be very foreign to this work, were the subject of
Malayan Agriculture to be discussed in it at large, or the yet more
interesting one of the cultivation of produce for the home market.
The following may be about an average of the value of property
of every description :
I Specie Dollars.
V a l u e of l a n d s i n c u l t i v a t i o n . . . . . 1 9 9 , 0 0 0
V a l u e of f r u i t - b e a r i n g t r e e s , a g r e e a b l y t o r e t u r n s f r o m d i s t r i c t s 1 7 9 , 2 0 0
V a l u e of buffa loes , b l a c k c a t t l e , a n d o t h e r l i r e s t o c k . . 1 5 , 0 0 0
A g r i c u l t u r a l s tock ( d e a d ) . . . . . 1 1 , 0 0 0
B o a t s 1 3 , 5 6 0 , a n d fishing-stakes 4 0 0 . . . 1 3 , 9 6 0
N a t i v e h o u s e s a n d g r a n a r i e s 1 8 , 0 0 0 . . . . 6 7 , 0 0 0
G o v e r n m e n t b u i l d i n g s , a n d g o v e r n m e n t officers ' h o u s e s . 2 , 9 0 0
T o t a l . . . 4 8 8 , 0 6 0
The uncleared land amounts to about 28,283 orlongs, or about
37,710 acres English.
The military resources which the government of Ligor possesses,
are by no means formidable, even when placed in opposition to the
comparatively very limited number of troops which garrison the
British settlements to the eastward. It is not believed that the Phraya,
or Governor, could collect above ten thousand fighting-men of all
descriptions, about one-third part only of which he can afford to
supply with decent arms ; or that such a militia, hastily assembled
—badly organized—without a proper degree of discipline—deficient
in zeal, and personally uninterested, owing to the oppression they
suffer, in the issue of their master's schemes, would openly ever be.
able [seriously to annoy the British; who by that exhibition of
strength which is perfectly consistent with, if not essential to, a
defensive policy in the East, would ever be prepared for events as
they should arise.
The Siamese prefer expeditions in boats to long marches. But
it is a singular fact, which has been before adverted to in this work,
and which did not pass unobserved by Loubere, that they are bad
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navigators, and totally disinclined to voyages out of sight of land.
The fact is singular, because applicable to a people who, from
inhabiting a very extensive tract of sea-coast, have every induce-
ment such a circumstance can afford to maritime enterprise.
Their war prahus contain from fifty to 100 men. They are not
always decked—their small artillery is rarely manageable; and the
whole equipment, except in a few used for show, is very paltry.
Their war-boats, and those of the Burmans, are nearly alike; and
we have seen how a gun-boat at Rangoon could disperse a fleet of
them, and destroy part.
The Siamese land and sea services, are not materially distinct
from each other. The subject becomes whatever his master desires,
from a serf in the field to a labourer on public works, or a soldier or
sailor in war. They are dexterous rowers, and seem to prefer con-
veyance by boats to any other. These boats, however, are well
enough calculated for making a sudden descent on an unguarded
coast; and it requires but a few months for the building of several
hundreds.
Were the Siamese ever to become so blind to their own interests,
and so fool-hardy as to meditate hostility towards the British
settlements in the Malacca Straits, their first object would be, to
prepare a large fleet of boats, for an attack on Penang, in their ports
of Keddah, Trang, Junkceylon, and Phunga, a measure which they
have frequently adopted for other purposes. It is difficult to suppose
that any co-operation from Siam by sea could be effected, if our
cruizers were vigilant, since the middle of the Straits of Malacca is,
in a great degree, under British control, and as the numerous pirates
lurking on the coasts would prevent Siamese prahus easily passing
close along them.
Such uncommon preparations as would be requisite to fit out
fleets of boats in the ports alluded to could not be kept secret,
and, if it were deemed necessary, could speedily be frustrated. But
were a fleet of such boats to reach the island, a gun-brig or two
would perhaps be equal to the task of compelling them to retreat.
If it were even to be supposed that an army from Siam Proper was
to join the Ligorean, and march across the Peninsula, the leaders
would probably proceed to Wellesley Province, with the greatest part
of their force, and there await the fleet which should convey the
remainder. An army so situated would be liable to be beaten in
detail, in an open country. For, admitting that by numbers it got a
footing in that territory, it would be compelled to remain inactive,
unless the fleet could reach it: and this might be prevented by
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blocking up the above-mentioned ports. Two regiments, at the
utmost, with the usual detachment of artillery, and supported by a
few gun-boats, might in the Straits defy the whole Siamese nation.
But Siam, unless indeed they leagued with the Malays, a very
improbable case, is too vulnerable by sea to the British, and by land
to the Burmans, Laos, Cochinchinese, and Cambojans, to admit of
her detaching a large army so far to the southward. Two British
frigates and a steamer, with complements of troops, Would be
sufficient perhaps, not only to carry the boasted " Seats of the Gods,"
but to destroy all their ports, and to suspend or annihilate their
trade.
There is a strong analogy between the Burman and Siamese
mode of governing. But in the details, it should seem that a firmer
chain of responsibility has been wrought throughout the body politic
in Siam than in Ava.
It is their unity of purpose alone, which has enabled the Siamese,
with inferior numbers in the field, to overawe several Malayan states.
It is in vain to indulge in the hope that the Malayan petty states will
ever firmly unite to resist Siamese aggression. These have never,
even in their best period, been united—have never constituted a
nation. The original Malayan government was apparently confined to
Sumatra, and was strongest about the ninth century: but many petty
chieftainships have since risen on its ruins.
Malacca was established in A. D. 572. But with reference to the
petty states bordering on the east shore of the Straits of Malacca,
they all naturally look for protection to the British. The fear of our
interference alone, checks the advance of the Siamese upon them.
Yet with such an asylum from ruin, these petty states secretly or
openly protect and abet the pirates, who systematically prey on the
native trader, and who dare even to attack small vessels bearing the
British flag, and to commit depredations and murders within sight
of the British ports.
On the west side of the Straits are several petty chiefs, who own
no superior, unless when forced to do so. They naturally fall under
the dominion of the Dutch, if we are to admit that any treaty
betwixt two European powers can transfer to either the right to
control these chiefs.
But the Dutch and British are bound by a treaty to co-operate
in expelling pirates from the Straits; and it is perfectly consistent
with the rights of nations, that the native chiefs, on both sides of
these Straits, should be required, or even, if necessary, compelled to
assist in finally suppressing them.
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With respect to the states on the Peninsula, a temperate, but
firm expostulation might have the desired effect; and should that
fail, other measures, warranted by a due regard for the rights of
trade, and the public safety, could be ultimately resorted to.
It is not probable that the court of Bankok will relax her rigid
rule over the provinces, Ligor and others, of Lower Siam, so as to
give them the opportunity to throw off their allegiance. Controlled
as each governor is, by a council of two officers of rank, it requires
the most guarded conduct on their parts to retain their situations.
Were they less under surveillance, and were Europeans allowed to
trade more freely with the inhabitants of their respective districts, it
is probable that they would assert independence. By intriguing
with the Cochinchinese and Cambojans, and bribing the Malayan
states bordering on his territory, and so as to keep them neutral, or
to gain their assistance, the Phraya of Ligor might without much
difficulty separate himself from Siam.
(To he continued.)
